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Moira Aikenhead* A "Reasonable" Expectation of Sexual
Privacy in the Digital Age
Two Criminal Code offences, voyeurism, and the publication of intimate images
without consent, were enacted to protect Canadians' right to sexual privacy in light of
invasive digital technologies. Women and girls are overwhelmingly targeted as victims
for both of these offences, given the higher value placed on their non-consensual,
sexualised images in an unequal society. Both offences require an analysis of whether
the complainant was in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of
privacy, and the use of this standard is potentially problematic both from a feminist
standpoint and in light of the rapidly evolving technological realities of the digital
age. This article proposes a feminist-inspired, technology-informed approach to
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in relation to these offences, and
examines the extent to which the Supreme Court of Canada's recent voyeurism
decision, R. v. Jarvis, aligns with this approach.
Deux infractions, le voyeurisme et la publication d'images intimes sans consentement,
ont ete ajoutees au Code criminel afin de proteger le droit des Canadiens a la vie priv~e
en matiere sexuelle a la lumiere des technologies numeriques envahissantes. Les
femmes et les filles sont tres majoritairement ciblees en tant que victimes de ces deux
infractions, etant donne la plus grande valeur accordee a leurs images sexualisees et
non consensuelles dans une societe inegale. Les deux infractions exigent une analyse
visant a determiner si la plaignante se trouvait dans des circonstances donnant lieu
a une attente raisonnable en matiere de protection de la vie privee, et Iutilisation de
cette norme peut poser probleme tant du point de vue feministe que compte tenu
de I'evolution rapide des realites technologiques a Iere numerique. Le present article
propose une approche d'inspiration feministe, fondee sur la technologie, a Iegard de
la norme d'attente raisonnable en matiere de protection de la vie privee relativement
a ces infractions, et examine dans quelle mesure la recente decision de la Cour
supreme du Canada dans I'affaire R. c. Jarvis s'inscrit dans cette approche.
* Moira Aikenhead, JD (U Vic), LLM. (UBC), PhD Candidate, University of British Columbia.
This paper developed out of a presentation delivered at the 2018 UBC Interdisciplinary Legal Studies
Graduate Conference, and discussions with members of the LEAF R v Jarvis case committee (see
mifra note 3). Thanks to my PhD Supervisor, Isabel Grant, for her invaluable insight on previous drafts
of this article.
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Two Canadian criminal offences, voyeurism and the publication of
an intimate image without consent (collectively, the "Sexual Privacy
Offences"), require the victim to have been in circumstances giving rise
to a reasonable expectation of privacy (REOP).1 Both of these crimes
involve significant harms to victims' dignity, bodily autonomy, and sexual
integrity. They are gendered crimes, and if they are not taken seriously
by governments, courts, and the general public, they pose a serious threat
to women's and girls' equality rights.2 As such, it is worrisome that the
legally amorphous concepts of "reasonableness" and "privacy" are central
to each offence.
1. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 162(1), 162.1(1) [Code].
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
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This paper explores the significant interpretive barriers that the
REOP requirement poses for judges tasked with determining whether the
elements of the Sexual Privacy Offences have been met, as well as the
problematic nature of this requirement from a feminist-informed, gender-
equality standpoint, and in the light of the ubiquity of invasive digital
technologies.3 I propose an approach to the REOP standard intended to
address these concerns, which entails treating privacy as a positive right,
and the REOP as a normative standard. The Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC), in its recent decision R. v. Jarvis, articulated an approach to the
REOP standard in relation to the voyeurism provisions that generally
accords with these recommendations, though it fails to recognize the
gendered nature of the Sexual Privacy Offences and their impact on
women's and girls' equality rights.' I argue that judges interpreting the
REOP standard in relation to the Sexual Privacy Offences must apply and
expand upon the approach set out in Jarvis, in order to account for the
significant harms to victims' sexual privacy, and women's and girls' right
to equality, occasioned by these offences.
I. The "sexual privacy" offences voyeurism and the non-consensual
distribution of intimate images
Voyeurism and the "publication, etc., of an intimate image without
consent" (the "non-consensual distribution of intimate images" [NCDII])
are conceptually similar offences. They were both ostensibly enacted to
protect Canadians from breaches of sexual privacy in the light of emerging
technologies, they require an analysis of victims' REOP as an element of
the offence, and they are gendered crimes. I will explore each of these
similarities below.
1. Protecting sexual privacy in a digital age
The Sexual Privacy Offences were both enacted in response to developments
in digital technology. The Department of Justice Consultation Paper on
voyeurism highlights rapid technological developments of the previous
years and their implications "for such basic matters as privacy and the
role of the law."5 Bill C-13, which contained the NCDII provisions, was
3. Many of the ideas advanced this paper were developed while I was a member of a case committee
for the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund [LEAF], in collaboration with other feminist
academics, in relation to LEAF's intervener's factum in the appeal ofR v Jarvis, 2017 ONCA 778 to
the Supreme Court of Canada. See: R vJarvis, 2018, SCC File No. 37833 (Factum of the Intervener
Women's Legal Education and Action Fund), available online: <http://www.leaf.ca/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/Factum-of-the-Intervener-Womens-Legal-Education-and-Action-Fund-Inc.-.....pdf)
[LEAF Factum].
4. R v Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 [Jarvis SCC].
5. Canada, Department of Justice, "Voyeurism as a Criminal Offence: A Consultation Paper"
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framed by the Conservative government as addressing "cyberbullying,"
considered by legislators and the public to be a pressing and disturbing
issue arising out of the ubiquity of social media websites and smartphones,
primarily impacting teenagers.6
The threats posed by these new technological innovations were viewed
by legislators as harms to a particular form of sexual privacy. Danielle
Keats Citron defines sexual privacy as "the social norms (behaviours and
expectations) that govern access to, and information about, individuals'
intimate lives,"'7 concerning concealment of naked bodies, seclusion of
intimate activities, and personal decisions about intimate life. She identifies
this form of privacy as crucial for sexual autonomy, identity formation,
and equality.' Canadian legislators appeared to have a similar interest
in mind when debating and enacting Code provisions prohibiting both
voyeurism and NCDII. The Legislative Summary of Bill C-2,9 containing
the voyeurism provisions, describes the crime as "both a sexual offence
and privacy offence,"1 and the Honourable Landon Pearson described
voyeurism as prohibiting "breaches of sexual privacy''11 at the Bill's
second reading in the Senate. A Department of Justice Consultation Paper
on the creation of a voyeurism offence notes that the state's interests in
protecting individual privacy and preventing sexual exploitation coalesce
in relation to voyeurism, which involves a breach of both privacy and
sexual or physical integrity. 
12
(Ottawa: DOJ, 2002) at at 1 [Canada, "Voyeurism Consultation Paper"]. Advances in recording
technologies in the early 2000s similarly prompted bans on video voyeurism in the United States
(see Danielle Citron, "Protecting Sexual Privacy in the Information Age" in Marc Rotenberg, Julia
Horwitz & Jeramie Scott, eds, Privacy in the Modern Age: The Search for Solutions (New York: The
New Press, 2015) 46 at 46-47).
6. Jane Bailey, "Time to Unpack the Juggernaut: Reflections on the Canadian Federal
Parliamentary Debates on Cyberbullying" (2014) 37:2 Dal LJ 661 at 663 [Bailey, "Juggernaut"];
Canada, Department of Justice, Report o the Federal/Provincial/Territorial/Ministers Responsible for
Justice and Public Safety: Cyberbullying and the Non-Consensual Distribution of Intimate Images,
by CCSO Cybercrime Working Group, Catalogue No J2-390/2013E-PDF (Ottawa: DOJ, 2013) at 14
[Canada, "Cyberbullying & NCDJJ'].
7. Danielle Keats Citron, "Sexual Privacy" (2018) Yale L J (forthcoming), at 4, online: <https:/
papers.ssnicom/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3233805> (accessed 13 February 2019) [Citron,
"Sexual Privacy"].
8. Ibid at 11-26.
9. Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable
persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, 1st Sess, 38th Part, 2005.
10. Canada, Law and Government Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Service,
Legislative Summary of Bill C-2: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and
other vulnerable persons) and the Canada Evidence Act, by Robin MacKay, Publication No LS-
480E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 13 October 2004), at 5, online: <https:Hlop.parl.ca/staticfiles/
PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/PDF/38-1 c2 e.pdf >.
11. Debates of the Senate, 38-1, vol 142, No 73 (20 June 2005) at 1530.
12. Canada, "Voyeurism Consultation Paper," supra note 5 at 8. See also Andrea Slane, "From
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The NCDII provisions fill a gap left by the voyeurism provisions,
which provide no sanctions for instances where non-voyeuristic sexualized
recordings are subsequently distributed without he consent ofthe person(s)
depicted.13 High-profile Canadian cases including the suicide deaths of
Rehteah Parsons, Amanda Todd, and Todd Loik, which were framed by the
media as resulting from "cyberbullying," and growing public awareness
and concern over activities such as "sexting" and "revenge pornography,"
resulted in calls on legislators to criminalize NCDII.14 The final report of a
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Working Group tasked with identifying gaps
in the Code regarding cyberbullying and NCDII describes the proposed
offence as protecting "similar privacy interests as the existing offence of
voyeurism,"5 and clarified that the definition of "intimate image" was not
intended to refer to images that are simply embarrassing or unflattering,
but those that "relate to the core of a person's privacy interest."6
2. Circumstances giving rise to a reasonable xpectation ofprivacy
Both voyeurism and NCDII were enacted out of a perceived need to
protect a specific, core privacy interest related to sexual integrity. The
centrality of the concept of privacy to each offence is demonstrated by
the fact that both require an observation or ecording to have taken place
in circumstances giving rise to a REOP. While the concept of a REOP
has received significant judicial analysis in the context of section 8 of
the Charter, which guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizure, no other Code offences require an analysis of victims'
REOP as an element of the offence.
1 7
The voyeurism provisions require that the accused must have
surreptitiously observed or recorded a person, in circumstances that give
rise to a REOP, in one of the following circumstances:
(a) the person is in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected
to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her
breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity;
Scanning to Sexting: The Scope ofProtectionofDignity-Based Privacy in Canadian Child Pornography
Law" (2010) 48 Osgoode Hall U 543 at 573-574 [Slane, "Scanning"].
13. The printing, publication, etc., of voyeuristic recordings is prohibited by s 162(4) of the Code,
supra note 1.
14. See Mylynn Felt, "The Incessant Image: How Dominant News Coverage Shaped Canadian
Cyberbullying Law" (2015) 66 UNBLJ 137 at 137; Bailey, "Juggernaut," supra note 6 at 663-664.
15. Canada, "Cyberbullying & NCDII," supra note 6 at 17
16. Ibid.
17. Jane Bailey, "Framed by Section 8: Constitutional Protection of Privacy in Canada" (2008) 50:3
Can J Criminology & Crim Justice 279 at 280 [Bailey, "Framed by Section 8"]; Jarvis SCC, supra
note 4, at para 118, Rowe J, concurring.
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(b) the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal
region or her breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and
the observation or recording is done for the purpose of observing or
recording a person in such a state or engaged in such an activity; or
(c) the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose.8
The REOP standard is also incorporated into the NCDII offence as a central
component of the definition of "intimate image." An "intimate image" is
defined as a visual recording of a person made by any means including a
photographic, film, or video recording:
(a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or
anal region or her breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity;
(b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were
circumstances that gave rise to a [REOP]; and
(c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a [REOP] at the time
the offence is committed.9
If an image or recording meets the definition of "intimate image," then a
person who knowingly publishes or distributes that image, knowing the
person depicted did not consent to that conduct or being reckless as to
whether or not the person gave consent to that conduct, will be guilty of
NCDII.2"
Parliament gave no direction in the legislation about the meaning of
"circumstances giving rise to a [REOP]" in relation to either of the Sexual
Privacy Offences. The wording of the two provisions, and the interests
at stake in each, are similar enough that judicial interpretation of what
constitutes a REOP in relation to one offence will likely inform analysis
of the other.21
3. Gendered offences
Before proceeding with an analysis of the Sexual Privacy Offences
as gendered crimes, I note that people who are transgender, gender
non-binary, two spirit, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or who otherwise do not
conform to "traditional" Western gender or heterosexual norms, are likely
18. Code, supra note 1, s 162(1).
19. Ibid, s 162.1(2).
20. Ibid, s 162.1(1).
21. See Canada, Legal and Social Affairs Division, Parliamentary Information and Research
Service, Legislative Summary of Bill C-13: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence
Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, by Julia Nicol
& Dominique Valiquet, Publication No 41-2-C13-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 11 December
2013) at 4, 16, n 7, online: <https:Hlop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/
LegislativeSummaries/PDF/41-2/c 13-e.pdf>.
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to be victims of many forms of violence, including the Sexual Privacy
Offences, at disproportionate rates.22 Crimes against LGBTQ+ individuals
are often informed by the same patriarchal, misogynist, or heterosexist
narratives that underlie gendered violence against (cisgender) women
more generally.23 In this paper I focus on the specific impact of the Sexual
Privacy Offences on women and girls in general, as publicly available
Statistics Canada data does not indicate whether victims of the Sexual
Privacy Offences are LGBTQ+ persons, and the available Canadian case
law involves overwhelmingly male perpetrators and female victims,
frequently in the context of heterosexual intimate partnerships.24 There is
a pressing need for more research on how the Sexual Privacy Offences
are carried out against and affect LGBTQ+ individuals, and the LGBTQ+
community more broadly.
Both voyeurism and NCDII are gendered crimes. They are each
overwhelmingly committed by men and boys against women and girls.2
Jane Bailey and Carissima Mathen categorize voyeurism and NCDII as
variants of the wider phenomenon of technology-facilitated violence
against women and girls, which involves the objectification of the victim
and an appropriation of the victim's sexual integrity by the offender for
his own ends.26 They argue that the form of objectification inherent in
these crimes uniquely merits criminal culpability."7 Anastasia Powell
similarly argues that NCDII must be considered as part of a continuum of
22. See Statistics Canada, Violent Victimization ofLesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals in Canada, 2014,
by Laura Simpson, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 31 May 2013); Anastasia
Powell, Adrian J Scott & Nicola Henry, "Digital Harassment and Abuse: Experiences of Sexuality and
Gender Minority Adults" (2018) 0 Eur J Criminology 1.
23. Wirtz et al describe gender-based violence as "an umbrella term that refers to any physical,
sexual, or other emotional violence perpetrated on the basis of socially ascribed gender differences."
(Andrea L Wirtz, et al, "Gender-Based Violence Against Transgender People in the United States:
A Call for Research and Programming" (2 0 1 8) 0 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1 at 1, citing United
Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GARes 48/104, UNGAOR (20
Dec 1993). See also Powell, Scott & Henry, supra note 22 at 2.
24. See Moira Aikenhead, "Non-Consensual Distribution of Intimate Images as a Crime of Gender-
Based Violence" (2018) 30:1 CJWL 117; Jane Bailey & Carissima Mathen, "Technologically-
Facilitated Violence Against Women and Girls: If Criminal Law Can Respond, Should It?" (2017)
Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No 2017-44 at 5, online: <https: //papers.ssrarcom/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id-3043506>.
25. Between 2009 and 2016, at least 91 per cent of all persons charged with voyeurism were male
(1.5 per cent of accused were female and 8 per cent are not classified as either male or female), and 90
per cent of victims were female (statistics obtained from Statistics Canada, on file with the author). In
2016, 92 per cent of reported cases of NCDII in Canada involved female victims, and 72 per cent of
offenders in these cases were male (Aikenhead, supra note 24 at 122-123). See also Citron, "Sexual
Privacy," supra note 7 at 46.
26. Bailey & Mathen, supra note 24 at 4-6, 21-22.
27. Ibid at 26-27.
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gendered sexual violence and harassment targeting primarily women, as it
constitutes a violation of the victim's sexual autonomy.28
The sexual objectification at the core of the Sexual Privacy Offences
arises out of structural gender hierarchization and social scripts of male
entitlement to women's bodies.29 In its 2017 report entitled Taking Action
to End Violence against Young Women and Girls in Canada, the House of
Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women notes that cyber-
violence against women and girls, like other forms of gendered violence,
is used to "control women, to maintain men's dominance over women, and
to reinforce patriarchal norms, roles, and structures."3
Instances of the Sexual Privacy Offences that take place in the
context of former or current intimate relationships constitute part of the
"constellation of behaviours" present in abusive relationships, pursuant
to which men seek to manipulate, intimidate, and control their intimate
partners.1 In the prototypical case of "revenge pornography"3 2 a (typically
male) person posts nude or sexualized images of his former intimate
partner online, with a malicious motive to harm his former partner or
exact revenge upon her for some perceived wrongdoing.33 Andrea Slane
and Ganaele Langlois note that the growing online market for non-
consensually produced or distributed pornography is premised on "the
larger mainstream, male-oriented, heterosexual online pornography
28. Anastasia Powell, "Configuring Consent: Emerging Technologies, Unauthorised Sexual Images
and Sexual Assault" (2010) 43:1 Austl & NZ J Crim 76 at 77.
29. Nicola Henry & Anastasia Powell, "Sexual Violence in the Digital Age: The Scope and Limits of
Criminal Law" (2016) 25:4 Soc & Leg Stud 397 at 399 [Henry & Powell, "Sexual Violence"].
30. House of Commons, Standing Committee on the Status of Women, Taking Action to End
Violence against Young Women and Girls in Canada (March 2017) at 32 (Chair: Marilyn Gladu).
31. See Isabel Grant, "Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment Through a Lens of Responsibilization"
(2015) 52:2 Osgoode Hall U 552 at 558.
32. A growing number of academics, victims, and victims' advocates are critical of the use of the
term "revenge pornography," arguing this wording may imply consent on the part of the victim to be
depicted in a "pornographic" way, indicate the victim is somehow deserving of her victimization, or
place undue focus on the pornographic nature of the images rather than the harm involved in their non-
consensual distribution. See, e.g., Henry & Powell, "Sexual Violence," supra note 29 at 400-40 1; Clare
McGlynn, "Call 'Revenge Porn' What It Is: Sexual Abuse," Vox (10 July 2017), online: <https://www.
vox.com/first-person/2017/7/8/15934434/rob-kardashian-blac-chyna-revenge-porn-abuse>; Jason
Haynes, "Legislative Approaches to Combating 'Revenge Porn': A Multijurisdictional Perspective"
(2018) 39:3 Stat L Rev 319 at 320-321. I will use this term to refer to the specific prototypical case
described above, as distinct from other forms of NCDII.
33. Women are disproportionately targeted for this form of NCDII (Peter W Cooper, "The Right
to be Virtually Clothed" (2016) 91 Wash L Rev 817 at 819) and revenge pornography has been
characterized in the academic literature as "an act of hate speech against women as a group" (Janice
Richardson, "Spinoza, Feminism and Privacy: Exploring an Immanent Ethics of Privacy" (2014) 22:3
Fem Legal Stud 225 at 238) and a form of sexual wrongdoing similar to both criminal harassment and
sexual assault (Carissima Mathen, "Crowdsourcing Sexual Objectification" (2014) 3:3 Laws 529 at
540).
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industry-one that feeds specifically on the allure of the lack of consent and
on the combination of voyeurism and misogyny. "' Revenge pornography
websites exploit the additional "thrill" experienced by viewers over the
images' non-consensual nature and the inherent violation of the female
victim's autonomy and sexual integrity.35
Individual instances of voyeurism and NCDII may result in a range of
significant psychological, economic, and reputational harms for victims.36
The harms of these offences are often magnified for women and girls as
compared to men and boys, and lead to the collective equality interests of
women and girls as a group suffering.37 As more women have sexualized
images of their bodies produced, consumed, and distributed against their
will, the online market for non-consensual images will continue to grow,
and the denial of women's sexual agency may be perceived by consumers
of this material as commonplace or appropriate, placing a greater number
of women and girls at risk of victimization.38 Powell and Henry describe
the harms of online abuse and harassment as "embedded in the symbolic
violence of gendered power hierarchies and inequalities, which are in turn
normalized and are consequently less easily identified or remedied."39
Technology-facilitated violence against women and girls, including the
Sexual Privacy Offences, can reinforce fear and promote social isolation
and exclusion, contributing to and extending gender inequality.4
The gendered nature of the Sexual Privacy Offences, and the
centrality of digital technologies to each of these offences, render the
required assessment of whether there were circumstances giving rise a
34. Andrea Slane & Ganaele Langlois, "Debunking the Myth of 'Not My Bad': Sexual Images,
Consent, and Online Host Responsibilities in Canada" (2018) 30:1 CJWL 42 at 43.
35. See Andrea Slane, "Sexting and the Law in Canada" (2013) 22:3 Can J of Human Sexuality 117
at 120; Mary Anne Franks, "'Revenge Porn' Reform: A View from the Front Lines" (2017) 69 Fla L
Rev 1251 at 1254. See also Powell, supra note 28 at 80.
36. See, e.g., Danielle Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2014) at 7-8; Nicola Henry & Anastasia Powell, "Embodied Harms: Gender, Shame and
Technology-Facilitated Sexual Violence" (2015) 21:6 Violence Against Women 758.
37. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, "Criminalizing Revenge Porn" (2014) 49 Wake
Forest L Rev 345 at 353. See also Jane Bailey, "'Sexualized Online Bullying' Through an Equality
Lens: Missed Opportunity inAB v Bragg?" (2014) 59:3 McGill LJ 709 at 728.
38. Bailey describes a similar process in relation to "obscene" pornography (involving the the
undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of. crime, horror, cruelty and violence, as
a dominant characteristic), the production of which can shape and feed discriminatory and violent
attitudes towards women (Jane Bailey, "Missing Privacy Through Individuation: The Treatment of
Privacy inthe Canadian Case Law on Hate, Obscenity, and Child Pornography" (2008) 31:1 Dal LJ 55
at 71-72 [Bailey, "Missing Privacy"]). See also Franks, supra note 35 at 1255; Powell, supra note 28
at 79-80.
39. Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (London, UK: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2017) at 67.
40. Ibid.
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REOP distinctly problematic.1 I turn now to these concerns and potential
interpretive difficulties.
II. Critiques of legal privacy and reasonableness tandards
1. A feminist perspective
Feminist legal scholars have long expressed concern with legal deployments
of "objective" tests and standards, such as "reasonableness," in relation to
crimes of violence against women. Rosemary Hunter notes that the legal
system tends to incorporate such tests in areas "where the disjunction
between the experience of claimants and the experience of those who
frame the doctrine and make the decisions is at its widest,"42 such as
gender-based violence, sexual assault, harassment, and discrimination. The
Code 's criminal harassment provisions, for example, require that victims
"reasonably, in all the circumstances... fear for their safety or the safety
of anyone known to them."43 Isabel Grant argues that this requirement
is problematic given that as harassment often forms part of a pattern of
gendered intimate partner violence, women are likely to be uniquely
attuned to the cues of their abusive partners, and judicial interpretations
of the reasonableness of women's fears often reflect discriminatory
assumptions about how women should express and respond to fear.44
It is not just the "reasonableness" aspect of the REOP standard that
is problematic from a feminist standpoint. Privacy has always been a
contentious concept in feminist legal scholarship, and feminist theory
more generally. Early feminist activism in North America focused on
making public the "private" issues of domestic abuse and sexual assault,
as narratives of personal and territorial privacy served to justify state non-
interference in this gendered violence.45 Today, liberal conceptions of
privacy continue to emphasize the importance of intimacy, the body, sex,
and the home, all of which are concepts that have been central to certain
feminist critiques of the abuses of power that take place in "private"
spaces.46 Privacy, when understood as a negative right to exclude others,
41. See Aikenhead, supra note 24 at 129.
42. Rosemary Hunter, "Law's (Masculine) Violence: Reshaping Jurisprudence" (2006) 17:1 L &
Critique 27 at 38-39.
43. Code, supra note 1, s 264(1).
44. Grant, supra note 31 at 587-588.
45. See Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989) at 35-36, 168-169, 190-194; Lise Gotell, "When Privacy is Not Enough:
Sexual Assault Complainants, Sexual History Evidence and the Disclosure of Personal Records"
(2005-2006) 43 Alta L Rev 743 [Gotell, "Privacy is Not Enough"] at 747-750.
46. Richardson, supra note 33 at 227-228, citing MacKinnon, supra note 45.
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remains a deeply masculine, classed, and individualized ideal.47 It is rooted
in the notion of a "retreat" from the reach of the state and society, and
has frequently trumped women's and girls' rights to be free from violence
and intimidation.8 As a result, some equality-seeking reformers have
expressed skepticism that a conception of privacy as a negative right to
exclude could have any potential to promote women's equality interests.49
Where a legal right to privacy has been articulated in relation to
women, it has traditionally been aimed at protecting a particular version
of raced and classed feminine "modesty," designed to shield women (and
their male partners) from embarrassment and humiliation associated with
sexuality.5 Some contemporary feminist writers remain wary of social and
judicial understandings of privacy that view disclosures related to women's
bodies or sexuality as harmful because they are inherently shameful.1 If
sexualized images are understood in this way, it could result in judges
adopting victim-blaming narratives in cases where women have consented
to be photographed or recorded in a sexualized context, placing undue
scrutiny on victims' "risky" or "immodest" behaviour as diminishing the
reasonableness of their privacy expectations.2
While feminists have critiqued legal understandings of privacy rights
for decades, writers from other disciplines have recently begun to raise
significant concerns with the utility of privacy as a legal concept in the
light of emergent technologies.53 In the following section, I will highlight
some of these concerns that are relevant to the judicial interpretation of the
Sexual Privacy Offences.
47. Treating the right to privacy as existing only in private spaces means that this is a privilege
only the affluent can enjoy (Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, "Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The
Protection of Privacy in Public Places" (2000) 50:3 UTLJ 305 at 343).
48. Emily Laidlaw, "Online Shaming and the Right to Privacy" (2017) 6:4 Laws 3 at 17 [Laidlaw,
"Online Shaming"].
49. See Gotell, "Privacy is Not Enough," supra note 45 at 747-750; Jane Bailey, "Towards an
Equality-Enhancing Conception of Privacy" (2008) 31:2 Dal U 267 at 280 [Bailey, "Equality-
Enhancing"].
50. Bailey, "Equality-Enhancing," supra note 49 at 285-286, citing Anita Allen& Erin Mack, "How
Privacy Got Its Gender" (1990) 10 N Ill U L Rev 441 at 477-478; Elizabeth M Schneider, "The
Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's Rights" (2002) U Chi L Forum 137 at 146.
51. See Citron & Franks, supra note 37 at 362; Bailey, "Missing Privacy," supra note 38 at 70-71;
Lise Gotell, "The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized Violence: Feminist Law Reform, Judicial
Resistance, and Neo-Liberal Sexual Citizenship" in Dorothy E Chunn, Susan Boyd & Hester Lessard,
eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law, and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) at
140-141.
52. See Aikenhead, supra note 24 at 127, 129.
53. Bailey notes that it has taken new threats to privacy posed by emerging technologies to
generate a more mainstream acceptance of a social or collective account of privacy, in contrast to the
individualized, masculine account that has been at the centre of feminist critique for years (Bailey,
"Equality-Enhancing," supra note 49 at 289).
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2. "Reasonable "privacy expectations in the digital age
For a large number of Canadians, online life is merging with offline life to
the point of being nearly indistinguishable. For young people in particular,
online interactions may be at the centre of social life. 4 Significant changes
in how individuals interact with one another and go about their work and
daily lives have taken place in recent years, as a result of the internet
and rapidly developing digital technologies, and in many cases the law
has struggled to keep pace.55 As previously discussed, the Sexual Privacy
Offences were enacted in an attempt to address some of these new realities.
These changes have led to a significant amount of writing in recent
years about the challenges technology presents to privacy rights in relation
to our personal information. The sheer volume of potentially permanent
data that individuals now produce (intentionally and unintentionally), each
time they pursue an activity online, the aggregation of this data, and other
consequences of our networked world, have had significant implications
for foundational concepts such as the public/private divide, and control
and choice in relation to what we keep private.56 While a comprehensive
review of flaws in the legal privacy paradigm in the digital age is beyond
the scope of this paper, I highlight three key developments that scholars
and the courts have come to recognize as affecting privacy and the REOP
standard, and which must inform any interpretation of what constitutes a
REOP in relation to the Sexual Privacy Offences.
a. Traditionally private spaces may no longer be private
New technologies complicate what constitute "public" versus "private"
spaces. The widespread use of handheld, internet-equipped digital
technologies makes it such that formerly private activities can now be
instantaneously recorded and broadcast o online audiences. Indeed, many
people, particularly young people, intentionally allow dozens or hundreds
of other individuals into their private spaces, such as their bedrooms,
through the use of video-enabled smartphones or webcams. Given this
reality, can we consider a person who is in their bedroom to be in a
54. Jacquelyn Anne Burkell, "Remembering Me: Big Data, Individual Identity, and the Psychological
Necessity of Forgetting" (2016) 18:1 Ethics and Information Technology 17 at 20-2 1. See also Powell,
supra note 28 at 78.
55. See Susan Magoitaux, "Out of Sync: Section 8 and Technological Advancement in the Supreme
Court Jurisprudence" (2015) 71 SCLR 501 at 501-502; Agnes Callamard, "Are Courts Re-Inventing
Internet Regulation?" (2017) 31:3 Int'l Rev L Comp & Tech 323 at 324-325.
56. See, e.g., An Ezra Waldman, "Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked
World" (2015) 69 U Miami L Rev 559 at 584-588; Daniel Solove, "Introduction: Privacy, Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma" (2013) 126:7 Harv L Rev 126; Daniel J Solove, The Digital
Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (New York: NYU Press, 2004) at 1890
[Solove, Digital Person].
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"private" space if they are broadcasting using Facebook Live, Snapchat,
or YouTube? Indeed, it may not make sense to conceive of the activity
being recorded as taking place in any physical location. The SCC recently
touched on this interpretive difficulty in its section 8 decision R. v. Marakah,
where McLachlin C., writing for the majority, remarked on the difficulty
in determining the "location" of a text message conversation, given that
an "interconnected web of devices and servers creates an electronic world
of digital communication that, in the 21 st century, is every bit as real as
physical space."" In this context, questions such as "where" an activity
has taken place, and whether that place is public or private, will not yield
straightforward answers when they involve recording or communication
using digital technologies.
b. Increased surveillance and recording in public spaces
Whether one can expect any level of privacy in a public space, such as
a park, busy street, or restaurant, has been a matter of debate since long
before the current digital age. Some scholars have argued that social norms
such as expecting not to be stared at, followed, recorded, or scrutinized,
should confer a certain degree of privacy on persons in public spaces.8
Individuals assess how "public" a situation is, and adjust their behaviour
and privacy expectations accordingly.9
While individuals may have historically expected a certain degree of
privacy in public places, it is debatable whether that expectation can still
be considered "reasonable" in the light of the growing ubiquity of CCTV
surveillance and handheld digital recording technologies. Elizabeth
Paton-Simpson views impermanence as a relevant factor in considering
whether an expectation of privacy is "reasonable," finding that privacy
expectations can be violated by making a permanent record of what is
revealed in public only briefly. As such, she labels invasive technologies
such as surveillance cameras, microphones, and scanning devices, a "rogue
factor," disrupting both normal expectations of public privacy, and the
distinction between "public" and "private" places.61 The SCC recognized
the threat surveillance technologies pose to personal privacy as long ago as
1990, when La Forest J., writing for the majority in the search and seizure
decision R. v. Duarte, reflected that unregulated electronic surveillance
57. R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59 at paras 27-28, [2017] 2 SCR 608. McLachlin C.J. noted further
that location as a factor in the analysis of a REOP was developed in the context of territorial privacy
interests, and was not an easy fit with digital subject matter (at para 26).
58. See Waldman, supra note 56 at 598-600; Paton-Simpson, supra note 47 at 326-329.
59. Paton-Simpson, supra note 47 at 322.
60. Ibidat 327.
61. Ibidat321.
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had the potential to annihilate any expectations of privacy as against the
state in relation to personal communications.62
Further complicating this landscape, surreptitious recording of
private individuals by other private individuals is largely unregulated,
and the average person's ability to undertake such recording is rapidly
increasing. Given this reality, the argument could be made that private
citizens no longer have any "reasonable" expectation of privacy in public
spaces in relation to being either observed or recorded. In the context of
section 8 Charter jurisprudence, the SCC has clarified that whether or
not surveillance technologies are in common use or widely-adopted by
the public should not be determinative of the reasonableness of citizens'
privacy expectations.6 A diminished subjective expectation of privacy
(due, for example, to the prevalence of invasive surveillance technologies),
should not automatically result in a lowering of constitutional protections.64
Bailey argues that the understanding of privacy expressed by the SCC
has the potential to maintain a robust protection of privacy in Canadian
constitutional law, and that we must further develop an understanding of
the implications of surveillance beyond those experienced by individual
section 8 claimants.65
c. Decreased ability to control digital information
A final, relevant, difficulty with traditional understandings of privacy in the
digital age lies in individuals' inability to control their digital information,
including recordings of their image, and the scope of the potential audience
for that information if it is published online or disclosed to a third party.
In the not too distant past, one-on-one communication with another
person could generally be assumed to be private, apart from the risk that
the person would breach social conventions and disclose the contents of
the conversation to others.66 Even where conversations did not take place
in-person, a third party gaining access to a private communication would
require a telephone wiretap or physical interference with one's mail, both
of which would be a seemingly obvious breach of a reasonable person's
privacy expectations. This reality has begun to change, however, as digital
intermediaries with access to the content of our communications have
become central to nearly all forms of "one-on-one" digital interaction.
Susan Magoitaux notes that we can no longer exclude third parties from
62. R v Duarte, [1990] 1 SCR 30 at 44 [Duarte].
63. See R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 at para 57, [2004] 3 SCR 432 [Tessling].
64. Ibid at para 42. See also Bailey, "Framed by Section 8," supra note 17 at 293.
65. Bailey, "Framed by Section 8," supra note 17 at 303.
66. See Duarte, supra note 62 at paras 43-44.
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our information, and the lack of control we exercise over our digital
information in the hands of third parties is a social problem beyond the
criminal law arena.1
7
The SCC majority in the section 8 decision R. v. Dyment acknowledged
that in modem society, individuals may wish or be compelled to share
personal information with others, but that there are many situations where
a person will retain a reasonable expectation that the information shared
will remain confidential to the persons to whom and purposes for which it
was divulged.8 Communications technologies have evolved significantly
since Dyment, and it is questionable what degree of privacy individuals
can reasonably expect now that they are frequently required to agree to
unilaterally-drafted Terms of Service Agreements to engage in "private"
communications, which often provide intermediaries with access to vast
swaths of personal information.9
We have lost some further measure of control over our private
communications, in the sense that it is now easy for recipients to share
the contents of these communications with a potentially infinite audience.
Consenting to be photographed, or sending a photograph to a friend
or partner, inherently lowers one's REOP in that photograph, since the
existence of a digital recording factually diminishes one's control over
the image.7°Anne SY. Cheung argues that it is no longer meaningful to
differentiate the act of picture-taking from dissemination of information
-if we allow another person to take our picture, or send that person a
picture, we know that having that image broadly distributed online is as
simple as the click of a button.71 Given this reality, can any expectation of
privacy in one's digitally-recorded image truly be considered reasonable?
The question of whether a person can have any REOP in relation
to their digital image is even more acute in instances where they have
chosen to disseminate that recording, rather than merely consenting to be
photographed. As we have seen, the definition of "intimate image" in the
NCDII provisions requires that the subject must retain a REOP at the time
67. Magoitaux, supra note 55 at 506-507.
68. RvDyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417 at para 22 [Dyment].
69. See Nicolo Zingales, "Accountability 2.0: Towards a Special Responsibility for Internet
Intermediaries" (2013) GigaNet: Global Internet Governance Academic Network, Annual Symposium,
online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract-2809830> at 32-33. See also Emily Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in
Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2015) for a broader discussion of the control over information and expression
exercised by "internet information gatekeepers," the impact on the right to freedom of expression, and
the law's role in regulating these intermediaries.
70. Slane, "Scanning," supra note 12 at 560.
71. Anne SY Cheung, "Rethinking Public Privacy in the Internet Era: A Study of Virtual Persecution
by the Internet Crowd" (2009) 1:2 J of Media L 191 at 206 [Cheung, "Rethinking Public Privacy"].
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of the non-consensual distribution. This raises the question of whether a
person's consent to some limited disclosure will automatically result in a
loss of any and all REOP with regard to further dissemination.72 Waldman
argues that traditional theories of privacy premised on ideas of separation,
secrecy and exclusion, which would view privacy rights as extinguished
upon disclosure, are a poor fit in the new digital context.3
The current technological realities of the digital age are such that
most Canadians are aware, or should reasonably be aware, that digital
technologies can allow large audiences to view our activities in "private"
spaces; that we will frequently be recorded in public via CCTV and other
people's smartphones; that third party intermediaries have access to the
contents of our personal communications; and that any information about
ourselves, including images, that we share with others or allow to be
recorded digitally, have the potential to be easily, widely, and permanently
disseminated online. A strictly factual approach to assessing the existence
of a REOP in the modem, networked world, would result in extremely
limited circumstances where privacy can reasonably be expected.
III. A feminist-inspired, technology-informed approach to privacy
expectations
Given the gendered nature of the Sexual Privacy offences and digital
technologies' potential to erode privacy expectations, courts need to
approach the Sexual Privacy Offences' REOP standard in a manner that
is feminist-inspired (seeking to promote women's and girls' equality
interests) and technology-informed (accounting for modem technological
realities). Such an approach involves treating privacy as a positive right,
and the REOP as a normative standard, requiring consideration of relevant
values and interests such as women's and girls' Charter right to equality.
1. Privacy as a positive right
Understanding privacy as a positive right, as opposed to a negative right to
exclude, preserves the value of privacy in the modem, digital age, where
individuals are often required to choose between taking a minor risk of
exposure, or forgoing an activity or association altogether.4 This approach
72. The wording of the Code's NCDII provisions is such that one could argue that a person loses
any REOP in relation to an intimate image once it has been disclosed to another person, even if that
disclosure occurred non-consensually. For example, if an intimate partner sends an intimate image
to a third party without the consent of the subject, and the subject becomes aware of the disclosure,
the subject could be said to have lost her REOP in relation to the image with respect to any further
dissemination, since, as others have viewed the image it is no longer private, and it can be easily and
widely disseminated.
73. Waldman, supra note 56 at 613, 624.
74. See ibid at 588, citing Solove, Digital Person, supra note 56 at 87; Paton-Simpson, supra note
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protects the competing desires of people to maintain privacy while
participating socially, consistent with an interpretation of privacy as a set
of norms enabling interaction, rather than a state of social withdrawal."
Treating privacy as a positive right in relation to the Sexual Privacy
Offences would ensure that judicial determination of whether a REOP
exists will not turn exclusively on the degree to which a person exercises
control over their body or intimate images, which, as demonstrated
above, may be increasingly difficult in the digital age.76 Appearing in
public, consenting to be photographed in a sexualized context, or sharing
sexualized photographs with some limited audience will not result in an
automatic waiver of all privacy expectations when privacy is understood
as a positive right."7 Consent to some level of observation or recording
would be understood as limited to that particular activity or context.
7 8
This conception of privacy accounts for the differential harms inherent
in particular observation or recording activities, such as the distinction
between casual observation and focused staring, or incidental capture on
CCTV and targeted recording for a sexual purpose.79 Such distinctions
are necessary in the digital age, where technology greatly increases the
average person's ability to observe and record others, and where any
resulting recordings can be disseminated easily and widely online.
Women's and girls' equality rights would be significantly undermined
if the right to privacy were understood as a negative right to exclude
others, extending only to "private" locations, areas of the body that are
kept covered, or information or images over which an individual exercises
total control. Such an understanding would require women and girls to
take extraordinary measures to conceal their bodies in order to avoid being
objectified and sexualized for consumption online, and is reminiscent of
47 at 338.
75. See Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) at 7, cited in Bailey,
"Equality-Enhancing," supra note 49 at 273; Lisa Austin, "Privacy, Shame and the Anxieties of
Identity" (2012), online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract-2061748>, cited in Laidlaw, "Online Shaming,"
supra note 48 at 20.
76. Slane, "Scanning," supra note 12 at 545, 560, 570, 582. See also James Q Whitman, "The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty" (2004) 113:6 Yale LJ 1151 at 1161-1162, 1189,
1198, who explains that the European Union takes a dignity-based approach to privacy rights, as these
rights are grounded in an individual's ongoing right to control their public image, and a person's image
(including their nude image) is not definitively alienable.
77. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized that going about one's daily life is private
in nature, and one does not forfeit their right to privacy simply by existing out in the world (Laidlaw,
"Online Shaming," supra note 48 at 16). See also Slane, "Scanning," supra note 12 at 570.
78. See Paton-Simpson, supra note 47 at 333.
79. See ibidat 327.
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victim-blaming narratives in sexual assault cases, where avictim's clothing
or "risky" behaviour is conceived of as contributing to her assault.8"
2. A normative approach to privacy
The second element of a feminist-inspired, technology-informed approach
to privacy requires approaching the REOP as a normative standard. The
SCC has previously articulated that the REOP is a "normative, rather than
a descriptive standard" in the context of section 8 Charter jurisprudence.81
Pursuant to this approach, an analysis of whether a person had a REOP in
certain circumstances must be assessed in the light of the competing values
and interests at stake in the circumstances of a given case, rather than
whether an expectation of privacy was subjectively present or factually
reasonable.82 Such an understanding ensures that the lack of a subjective
expectation of privacy on the part of the victim (due, for example, to
the proliferation of privacy-invasive technologies) will not result in an
automatic loss of a REOP.83 Viewing privacy as lost when the risk of
observation or recording factually exists would be particularly problematic
in relation to the gendered Sexual Privacy Offences, as it would make the
scope of women's and girls' privacy expectations contingent on the market
demand for surreptitious recordings and recording technologies.84
A normative approach to the REOP standard requires consideration of
the values and interests at stake. In the context of section 8 jurisprudence,
the SCC has identified human dignity as a core value protected by the right
to privacy." Numerous academics have also emphasized the crucial role
privacy plays in protecting and preserving human dignity.86 As previously
noted, the Sexual Privacy Offences are aimed at protecting sexual privacy,
premised on the understanding that human dignity, bodily autonomy, and
80. Bailey & Mathen, supra note 24 at 45. See also Lise Gotell, "Rethinking Affirmative Consent in
Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Womef' (2008) 41:4 Akron L
Rev 865 at 879-882.
81. Tessling, supra note 63 at para 42.
82. See, e.g., Hunter et al v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 159-160 [Hunter], cited in R v
Patrick, [2009] 1 SCR 579 at para 14.
83. Tessling, supra note 63 at para 42.
84. See Paton-Simpson, supra note 47 at 340; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology,
Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010) at 235.
85. See Dyment, supra note 68 at paras 21-22; R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 at para 20, [2014] 3 SCR
621. The Court reasoned in Schreiber v Canada that the degree of privacy protected by the law "is
closely linked to the effect that a breach of that privacy would have on the freedom and dignity of the
individual" (Schreiber v Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 841 at para 19).
86. See Cheung, "Rethinking Public Privacy," supra note 71 at 210-212; David Luban, Legal
Ethics and Human Dignity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) cited in Laidlaw, "Online
Shaming," supra note 48 at 9-10; Chiristopher McCrudden, "HumanDignity and Judicial Interpretation
ofHuman Rights" (2008) 19 EJIL 655, cited inAnne Cheung, "Revisiting Privacy and Dignity: Online
Shaming inthe Global E-Village" (2014) 3:2 Laws 301 at 306.
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sexual integrity are significantly undermined through the non-consensual
nature of the observation, recording, or distribution at the heart of these
offences." Voyeurism and NCDII devalue victims' humanity through
sexualized objectification, instrumentalization, and humiliation.88
Sexual privacy is necessary for women's and girls' collective right
to equality, in addition to individual dignity, bodily autonomy, and
sexual integrity. Elizabeth Schneider argues that equality and privacy are
inextricably linked and mutually dependent in cases involving women's
rights, with concepts of equality being necessary for a robust understanding
of privacy, and privacy necessary for the full realization of equality.89 She
claims that "[p]rivacy that is grounded in equality and is viewed as an aspect
of autonomy, protecting bodily integrity and making abuse impermissible,
is based on a genuine recognition of dignity and personhood."9 Bailey
argues that judges must take an equality-enhancing approach to privacy in
the context of hate speech, obscenity, and child-pornography, which would
place greater value on privacy when it produces substantive equality (such
as women's right to sexual privacy in public spaces), and less value on
those forms of privacy that produce substantive inequality (such as a right
to privately abuse one's intimate partner).91
It is a presumption in statutory interpretation that Parliament intended
to enact legislation in conformity with the Charter, and a constitutional
reading is preferable over a reading that is unconstitutional.9 2 There has
been no recognition of a link between privacy and the Charter right to
equality in the section 8 jurisprudence. This is not surprising, given that
search and seizure law is concerned with state surveillance in relation
to law enforcement, rather than sexualised observation or recording
by private citizens. It is the sexualised nature of the Sexual Privacy
Offences that mark women and girls out as likely targets in a society that
normalizes their objectification. For the REOP standard in the Sexual
Privacy Offences to be read in a way that is consistent with women's and
girls' right to equality, judges must take into account the fact that women
and girls are overwhelmingly targeted as victims in these crimes on the
87. See Bailey, "Equality-Enhancing," supra note 49 at 277, who notes the significant impacts on
victims' dignity, independence, and autonomy, resulting from the threat of uncontrollable ongoing
circulation of a record of their abuse.
88. See Laidlaw, "Online Shaming," supra note 48 at 10, 13, who notes that "traditional" cases of
revenge pornography will always involve humiliation and constitute an affront to dignity.
89. Schneider, supra note 50 at 138.
90. Ibid at 152.
91. Bailey, "Equality-Enhancing," supra note 49 at 295.
92. SeeR v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 at para 33, [2001] 1 SCR 45 [Sharpe]; R vJarvis, 2018, SCC File
No. 37833 (Factum of the Appellant) at para 39; LEAF Factum, supra note 3 at para 32.
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basis of their gender, due to the same misogynistic narratives of male
entitlement to women's bodies that underlie other sexual offences, and
the negative impacts on women's and girls' right to equality occasioned
by these offences.93 The Jarvis decision presented the SCC with its first
opportunity to make explicit the link between privacy and equality in
relation to the Sexual Privacy Offences, and articulate an approach to the
REOP standard reflective of the gendered nature of these offences and
the significant threats to privacy inherent in the proliferation of invasive
digital technologies.94
IV. R. v. Jarvis
Jarvis involved a London, Ontario high school teacher who used a camera
pen to surreptitiously film female students at his school, focusing on their
chests and cleavage. As the recordings did not depict students who were
nude or engaged in sexual activity, or in a place where nudity or sexual
activity could be reasonably expected, Jarvis was charged under subsection
162(1)(c) of the Code, which prohibits voyeuristic observation or ecording
for a sexual purpose. At trial, Jarvis was acquitted because the trial judge
was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the videos were recorded
for a sexual purpose.95 On appeal, Feldman J.A., writing for the majority
of the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal. While finding the
recordings had been made for a sexual purpose, the majority disagreed
with the trial judge's finding that the students were in circumstances that
give rise to a REOP, given that they were in a location where they knew
they could be observed and recorded by security cameras.
9 6
The only issue for determination before the SCC was whether the
Court of Appeal erred in finding the students were not in circumstances
giving rise to a REOP.97 Jarvis argued that a person has a REOP: in a place
where they expect not to be observed; in relation to parts of their body that
are kept covered or hidden; or in relation to particular people who they do
not expect to observe them in a given space, reflecting an understanding
93. See LEAF Factum, supra note 3 at paras 1, 3; Slane & Langlois, supra note 34 at 43.
94. See LEAF Factum, supra note 3 at paras 4, 34; R v Jarvis, 2018, SCC File No. 37833 (Factum
of the Intervener Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic), available
online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/37833/FM030 Intervener
Samuelson-Glushko-Canadian-Internet-Policy-and-Public-Interest-Clinic.pdf> [CIPPIC Factum] at
paras 4, 18.
95. R vJarvis, 2015 ONSC 6813 at para 77.
96. R v Jarvis, 2017 ONCA 778 at paras 53-54, 8, 94, 104-105, 139 OR (3d) 754 [Jarvis ONCA].
Feldman J.A. found that any REOP in a public space would extend only to "areas of the body that are
kept covered or hidden" (at para 96).
97. Jarvis SCC, supra note 4 at para 4.
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of privacy as a negative right to exclude.98 A determination of whether
a REOP exists would, on this interpretation, turn on the location where
the person is observed, and the degree of control they have over who
may obtain visual access to them in that space.99 The Crown argued that
whether a REOP exists must be interpreted broadly, based on the totality
of the circumstances.100
The SCC agreed with the approach recommended by the Crown,
finding that circumstances that give rise to a REOP "are circumstances in
which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type
of observation or recording that in fact occurred,"1 based on the entire
context in which the observation or recording took place. Wagner C.J.,
writing for the majority, outlined a non-exhaustive list of considerations
in determining whether a person was in circumstances that gave rise to a
REOP for the purpose of the voyeurism provisions, including:
* The location where the person was observed or recorded;
* Whether the impugned conduct consisted of observation or recording
(as recording may involve a greater violation of privacy);
* Awareness or consent o potential observation or recording;
* The manner in which the observation or ecording was done;
* The subject matter of the observation or recording (including whether
a specific person or persons were targeted, the activity they were
engaged in, and the parts of the body on which the observation or
recording was focused);
* Any rules, regulations or policies that governed the observation or
recording;
* The relationship between the target and the person who did the
observing or recording;
* The purpose of the observation or recording; and
* The personal attributes of the target of the observation or recording
(such as their age).102
Applying these factors to the facts of the case at bar, Wagner C.J. found
that the students Jarvis recorded had been in circumstances giving rise to
a REOP, and convicted Jarvis of voyeurism.0 3 For the remainder of this
section, I will analyze the extent to which the reasons in Jarvis accord with
a feminist-inspired, technology-informed approach to the REOP standard,
98. Ibid at para 25.
99. Ibid at paras 25-26.
100. Ibid at para 27.
101. Ibidatpara 5.
102. Ibid at para 29.
103. Ibid at paras 72-88, 92.
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both in treating privacy as a positive right, and in understanding the REOP
as a normative standard.
1. Privacy as a positive right
The majority reasons in Jarvis reflect an understanding of privacy as a
positive right. Wagner C.J. relied on section 8 jurisprudence in reaching
numerous conclusions supportive of this understanding, finding section 8
jurisprudence "represents a rich body of judicial thought on the meaning
of privacy in our society""1 4 and reflects Canadians' shared ideals about
privacy. The majority found that individuals may retain a REOP even in
places where they know they can be observed by others, or from which
they cannot exclude others, and whether a person has a REOP in relation
to certain conduct cannot turn on whether there was a risk they would
be observed or recorded."5 Further, the majority's reasons indicate that
consent to or awareness of some level of observation or recording must not
be understood as consent to all forms of observation or ecording, finding
that privacy is not an "all-or-nothing" concept.0 6 Individuals may be in
circumstances where they can expect to be the subject of certain types of
observation or recording, but not the subject of other types.0 '
The majority's reasons highlight the fact that recording may represent
a fundamentally different level of intrusion than observation, as it can
capture a level of detail the human eye cannot, is subject to manipulation,
and can result in ongoing harms as victims live with the awareness that
a recorded image may continue to exist and be viewed by the accused
or others.0 ' Recordings, according to Wagner C.J., can be "shared with
others-including others whom the subject of the recording would not
have willingly allowed to observe her in the circumstances in which the
recording was made."109 Such a distinction is crucial in the digital age,
where the potential for privacy-related harms increases exponentially
when a person or activity is recorded, given the significant potential for
widespread dissemination of such recordings online.
2. A normative approach
The majority in Jarvis found that the question of whether a person
reasonably expects privacy is "necessarily a normative question that is to
104. Ibid at para 59. Cote, Brown and Rowe JJ disagreed with this approach in their concurring set
of reasons, finding that the conceptual framework of Charter rights and Code offences should remain
distinct (at paras 93-106).
105. Ibid at paras 37-40, 61, 68.
106. Ibid at paras 41, 61.
107. Ibid at paras 38, 62.
108. Ibid at para 62, citing Sharpe, supra note 92 at para 92.
109. Ibid at para 74.
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be answered in light of the norms of conduct in our society.""11 Increasing
development and availability of digital recording technologies, and
individuals' awareness of these technologies, will not result in an automatic
diminishment or waiver of privacy expectations, or a finding that retaining
such expectations is unreasonable."' Indeed, Wagner C. notes that
such a factual approach would render the REOP standard meaningless,
undermining Parliament's purpose in enacting the voyeurism provisions.1
The majority's reasons recognize privacy's inherent connection to
a number of values and interests in the context of voyeurism, including
human dignity, sexual integrity, and the right to privacy in one's body.11 3
Wagner C.1. cites section 8 jurisprudence in finding that individual dignity
and autonomy are particularly harmed through violations of personal and
informational privacy, and that safeguarding information about oneself is
of paramount importance in modem society, closely tied to the dignity
and integrity of the individual. 4 The majority's reasons highlight the
particularly harmful nature of sexualized privacy invasions, finding there
exists "societal consensus that there is a sphere of privacy regarding
information about our sexual selves that is particularly worthy of respect,1 .15
that sexualized interference or intrusion is uniquely pernicious, and that
the voyeurism provisions' purpose in protecting individuals from sexual
exploitation militates against a narrow reading of the REOP standard.
While the majority's reasons recognize the sexual privacy interests at
stake in cases of voyeurism, Wagner C.1. emphasizes that the determination
of whether a REOP exists "does not involve an ad hoc balancing of the
value of the accused's interest in observation or ecording against he value
of the observed or recorded person's interest in being left alone."1 6 The
majority rejected the approach taken by Huscroft JA. in his dissenting
reasons at the Ontario Court of Appeal, in which he found that a normative
approach to the REOP standard requires identifying the competing interests
at stake, and finding a person has a REOP "is to conclude that his or her
interest in privacy should be prioritized over other interests."'
The approach taken by Huscroft J.A. is more consistent with a
feminist-inspired, equality-enhancing approach to the REOP as a truly
110. Ibid at para 68, citing Tessling, supra note 63 at para 42.
111. Ibid at paras 63, 68, citing Tessling, supra note 63 at paras 16, 42.
112. Ibid at para 68, citingR v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36 at 45.
113. Ibid at paras 48-51, 65-67.
114. Ibid at paras 67, 66, citing Dyment, supra note 68 at 429.
115. Ibid at paras 52, 82.
116. Ibid at para 69 (emphasis in original).
117. Jarvis ONCA, supra note 96 at para 117.
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normative standard. The concurring judges in Jarvis would have adopted
Huscroft J.A.'s approach, finding the infringement of a person's REOP in
the context of voyeurism "can be conceptualized as crossing a threshold
where the law prioritizes the observed person's interest in protecting their
autonomy and sexual integrity over the accused's liberty of action."'118 The
concurring reasons highlight the fact that voyeurism is a sexual offence,
requiring an interpretation of privacy having regard to personal autonomy
and sexual integrity, such that an observation or recording will occur in
circumstances that give rise to a REOP when (a) it diminishes the subject's
ability to maintain control over their image and (b) it infringes the subject's
sexual integrity."9 Such an approach would require judges to specifically
consider the impact of an offender's actions on a victim's sexual integrity
as part of the REOP analysis, ensuring that the sexualized violation
inherent in voyeurism is given specific consideration in each case.
Neither the majority nor concurring reasons i entirely consistent with
an equality-enhancing, normative approach to the REOP standard, which
would require consideration not only of an individual complainant's
sexual privacy interests, but of the broader impact on women's and girls'
equality rights, each time judges are tasked with determining whether
a REOP existed in a given set of circumstances. While the majority in
Jarvis considered the sexual privacy interests protected by the voyeurism
provisions in electing to treat privacy as a positive right, and in finding
that privacy expectations will not be waived or eroded simply because
privacy-invasive technologies exist, they did not go so far as requiring
judges to specifically consider the values and interests at stake each time
a REOP is assessed.2 ' Neither the majority nor concurring reasons in
Jarvis mention the gendered nature of voyeurism, or highlight equality
as a value implicated in the Sexual Privacy Offences. This represents a
significant missed opportunity, and a seemingly intentional choice by the
Court, given that both sets of reasons explicitly highlight other values at
stake in voyeurism, and two separate interveners called on the Court to
recognize the gendered nature of voyeurism and its impacts on women's
and girls' equality.' That is not to say that the gendered nature of these
offences, or interveners' arguments for an equality-enhancing approach,
118. Jarvis SCC, supra note 4 at para 132.
119. Ibid at paras 118, 133.
120. Wagner C.J. emphasizes that "the only question to be asked in determining whether a person who
is observed or recorded was in circumstances that give rise to a [REOP] is whether that person was in
circumstances in which she would reasonably have expected not to be the subject of the observation
or recording at issue" (Ibid at para 70).
121. See LEAF Factum, supra note 3 at paras 4, 34; CIPPIC Factum, supra note 94 at paras 4, 18.
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did not inform judicial interpretation of the REOP standard in Jarvis. The
majority's reasons reflect an awareness that it is women and girls who are
disproportionately targeted by this crime, as the pronoun "she" is used
consistently throughout the decision in reference to hypothetical victims
of voyeurism.122
The positive, normative approach to privacy and the REOP standard
adopted by the majority will go a long way toward protecting the sexual
privacy of potential victims of voyeurism, who are overwhelmingly
women and girls. It has the result that women and girls will not be found,
by virtue of appearing in public, consenting to be recorded in a particular
context, consenting to sexual activity, or wearing "revealing" clothing, to
have waived their dignity-based rights to sexual privacy.123 Individuals
who would choose to non-consensually objectify and instrumentalize
women and girls for their own sexual gratification have now been given a
clear message that such behaviour is not only harmful, but criminal when
it involves surreptitious observation or recording. While the gendered
nature of voyeurism was not specifically addressed, the majority's reasons
recognize the significant values at stake in cases of voyeurism beyond
a negative, control-based right to privacy, and have opened the door for
judges in future decisions to ensure that women and girls can retain privacy
expectations in relation to their own images and bodies in the vast majority
of circumstances where they are non-consensually observed or recorded.
In the final section of this paper, I outline some initial thoughts on how the
majority's reasons in Jarvis may apply in the context of the other Sexual
Privacy Offence, NCDII.
V. Implications for the non-consenual distribution of intimate images
provisions
As previously noted, the approach to the REOP standard articulated in
Jarvis is likely to be applied in relation to NCDII, given the significant
conceptual similarities between the two Sexual Privacy Offences."'4
While both offences require an assessment of the complainant's REOP,
the NCDII provisions incorporate this standard in such a way as to make
direct application of the contextual factors outlined by the majority in
Jarvis somewhat difficult. In order for a recording to meet the definition
122. Jarvis SCC, supra note 4 at paras 37-40.
123. See Bailey & Mathen, supra note 24 at 45.
124. While neither the majority nor concurring judgment inJarvis discussed the implications of their
interpretation of the REOP standard for the NCDJJ provisions, Rowe J's concurring reasons note
that voyeurism and NCDJJ are the first offences in the Code to include a complainant's REOP as an
element of the offence (Jarvis SCC, supra note 4 at para 118).
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of "intimate image" under the NCDII provisions, judges must assess a
complainant's REOP at two distinct points in time: when the recording
was made, and when it was non-consensually distributed.125 If the
recording was not made in circumstances giving rise to a REOP, or if the
person depicted no longer retained a REOP at the time of distribution, the
recording is not an "intimate image" and its non-consensual distribution
will not constitute a criminal offence.
The first REOP analysis required by the NCDII provisions relates to
the complainant's privacy expectations at the time of recording, similar
to the voyeurism provisions. In Jarvis, the majority found that a REOP
in the voyeurism context is "an expectation that one will not be observed
or visually recorded."'126 This interpretation makes sense in the voyeurism
context, where the observation or ecording must be done surreptitiously
in order to ground a conviction. The NCDII provisions, on the other hand,
were specifically intended to apply to recordings that were initially made
with the consent or participation of the person depicted.2 ' This begs the
question: what circumstances will give rise to a REOP in relation to a
consensual sexualised recording?
The majority in Jarvis found that determining whether a person was in
circumstances that give rise to a REOP "requires determining whether the
person was in circumstances in which she would have reasonably expected
to be free from the type of intrusion... that she experienced."28 In the context
of NCDII, the recording itself may not be inherently intrusive, and as such
an analysis of whether the recording was made in circumstances that give
rise to a REOP should seek to answer whether the recording was made in
circumstances in which the complainant would reasonably be expected
to be free from the type of non-consensual distribution that ultimately
occurred. This, like the REOP analysis in the voyeurism provisions, would
require judges to take into consideration the entire context in which the
observation or ecording took place.
There may be a significant temporal gap between the time a recording
is made (when the complainant's initial REOP crystallizes), and the time
of distribution. As a result, any circumstances that could erode or negate
the complainant's initial REOP arising between the time of recording and
time of distribution can be accounted for in the second analysis of REOP
required by the provisions: whether the person depicted retains a REOP at
125. Code, supra note 1 at ss 162.1(2)(b), 162.1(2)(c).
126. Jarvis SCC, supra note 4 at para 36.
127. Canada, "Cyberbullying & NCDJJ," supra note 6 at 16.
128. Jarvis SCC, supra note 4 at para 71.
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the time of distribution. Whether or not a person retains a REOP at the time
of distribution can be answered by assessing whether a reasonable person
would continue to expect that the recording would not be distributed in the
manner that in fact occurred, in light of all the circumstances.129
The non-exhaustive list of considerations set out by the majority in
Jarvis for assessing whether a person was in circumstances that give rise
to a REOP may serve as a starting point for judges in determining whether
a person had or retained a REOP under the NCDII provisions. How each of
these factors will be interpreted and applied in relation to both voyeurism
and NCDII remains to be seen in the emerging case law. For now, what
is crucial is that the broader approach taken by the majority in Jarvis,
namely, treating privacy as a positive right and the REOP as a normative
standard, is taken up and expanded upon by judges in cases of NCDII.
Given that the NCDII provisions are intended to cover recordings
that were initially made with the participation or consent of the person
depicted, privacy must be understood as a positive right in order to
ensure that this initial consent is not understood as ongoing consent to
subsequent dissemination of that recording. Similarly, this understanding
can ensure that a person who appears nude or engages in sexual activity
in a public or semi-public setting does not automatically lose any and all
REOP with respect o any recording of that activity. This approach should
apply regardless of whether the individual is aware simply of the risk
they could be recorded, or are in fact aware that they are being recorded,
as the majority in Jarvis noted that recordings that are made openly can
breach a person's REOP (though such recordings would not be captured
by the voyeurism provisions).130 Understanding privacy as a positive right
reflects the differential harms of recording, as opposed to observation, in
a digital age.
That is not to say an individual's decision to appear nude or engage in
sexual activity in a public space, while aware they are being or could be
recorded, would not result in a diminishment of their REOP. Factors such
as location and awareness or consent to observation or ecording are part
of the context that should inform a court's analysis of whether a person had
or retained a REOP in relation to their sexualised images."' However, it is
crucial that judges applying the NCDII provisions reject a strictly location-
or risk-based approach, in line with the majority's reasons in Jarvis. If
being nude or engaging in sexual activity in a public setting automatically
129. See ibid at paras 5, 28, 91.
130. Ibid at para 33.
131. Ibid at para 29.
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extinguished one's REOP in any resulting recordings, an individual who,
for example, is filmed while being sexually assaulted in a semi-public
space such as a house party would have no REOP, and distribution of those
unquestionably harmful recordings would not constitute NCDII. Such a
result would clearly be contrary to Parliament's intentions in enacting the
NCDII provisions, and would significantly undermine the victim's sexual
privacy, and women's and girls' collective right to equality."'
Conclusion
The proliferation of handheld, internet-equipped, digital recording
technologies has revealed latent ambiguities in our basic social and legal
understandings of privacy.133 Activities in "private" spaces may now be
broadcast widely online, appearing in public carries with it a significant
risk of being recorded, and personal information and recordings can
be disseminated to a nearly infinite audience with the click of a button.
How judges interpret the right to privacy in the digital age has significant
potential to shape the future of the internet, and therefore society.134
Women and girls are most likely to be victims of the Sexual Privacy
Offences, as these offences are grounded in the same misogynistic
narratives that underlie sexualized offending against women and girls
more generally. The approach outlined by the majority in Jarvis highlights
that women and girls can reasonably expect not to be non-consensually
objectified, observed, and recorded in both traditionally "public" and
"private" spaces, representing a crucial clarification in a society marked
by gender inequality and invasive digital technologies. While neither the
majority nor concurring reasons in Jarvis made explicit the link between
the Sexual Privacy Offences and women's and girls' right to equality, by
understanding REOP as a normative standard, the decision leaves open
the possibility that future judges will adopt a truly equality-enhancing
approach to the REOP standard in the digital age.
132. This example closely resembles the sexualized victimization of Rehtaeh Parsons, whose death
by suicide after having her assault recorded and her subsequent bullying was an impetus for Bill C-13
(See Felt, supra note 14; Bailey, "Juggernaut," supra note 6 at 672).
133. In his seminal books on Internet Regulation, Code and Code 2.0, Lawrence Lessig notes the
technologies of the internet reveal such ambiguities in constitutional law, and argues that the legal
system must translate constitutional principles in this new context, rather than allowing private entities
and market forces to shape online norms and social values (Lawrence Lessig, Code, Version 2.0 (New
York: Basic Books, 2006) at 25, 157-168). See also Nissenbaum, supra note 84 at 118.
134. See Callamard, supra note 55.
